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Original Sin: 
Analysing Its Mechanics and a proposed Remedy 
in a Simple Macroeconomic Model
1 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the problem of "original sin" (the fact that the currency of an emerg-
ing  market  economy  usually  cannot  be  used  to  borrow  abroad)  in  a  simple  third-
generation model of currency crises. The approach differs from alternative frameworks 
by explicitly modeling the price setting behavior of firms if prices are sticky and the fu-
ture exchange rate is uncertain. Monetary policy optimally trades off effects on price 
competitiveness and on debt burdens of firms. It is shown that the proposal by Eichen-
green and Hausmann of creating an artificial basket currency as denominator of debt is 
attractive as a provision against contagion. 
 
Keywords: original sin; currency crises  
JEL classifications: F34 
 
                                                 
1  I would like to thank Diemo Dietrich, Tobias Knedlik, and Johannes Stephan for helpful comments. 
Any errors are my own.  
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Zusammenfassung 
Der Artikel analysiert das “Erbsünden-Problem” (die Tatsache, dass sich ein Schwellen-
land üblicherweise nicht in Einheiten der eigenen Währung verschulden kann) im Rah-
men  eines  Währungskrisenmodells  der  dritten  Generation.  Der  Ansatz  unterscheidet 
sich von anderen Modellen dieses Typs dadurch, dass das Preissetzungsverhalten der 
Unternehmen explizit modelliert wird. Dabei haben die Unternehmen zu beachten, dass 
Preise kurzfristig fix sind und der zukünftige Wechselkurs unsicher ist. Geldpolitik ist 
optimal in dem Sinn, dass die Zentralbank die Folgen ihrer Politik für die Wettbewerbs-
fähigkeit der Unternehmen auf der einen Seite und für deren Auslandsschuldenlast auf 
der  anderen  Seite  gegeneinander  abwägt.  Es  wird  gezeigt,  dass  der  Vorschlag  Ei-
chengreens und Hausmanns, auf den internationalen Finanzmärkten einen Schwellen-
länder-Währungskorb als Basis von Schuldverschreibungen zu etablieren, als Vorsor-
gemaßnahme gegen Ansteckungseffekte von Währungskrisen taugen könnte.   
 
Schlagworte: Erbsünde; Währungskrisen   
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Original Sin: 
Analysing Its Mechanics and a proposed Remedy 
in a Simple Macroeconomic Model 
This  paper  analyses  the  macroeconomic  consequences  of  currency  mismatches  in 
emerging market countries due to original sin. For this purpose, a simple third-gene-
ration model of currency crises is constructed. The model helps also clarifying under 
which conditions the denomination of debt in an emerging market (EM) index can miti-
gate the problem of original sin. 
Section 1 explains briefly the problem of currency mismatch and the proposal to solve it 
via the EM index. Section 2 reviews alternative models suitable for analysing original 
sin and explains why this paper takes a somewhat different approach. Section 3 presents 
the model (in 3.1 and 3.2) and its policy implications (in 3.3). Section 4 concludes. 
1.  Currency mismatches, original sin, and a reform proposal 
Financial  crises  in  emerging  market  economies  have  frequently  disturbed  the  world 
economy during the last decades. A major element in almost every major crisis was a 
currency mismatch (Goldstein (2004), page 1). This concept means that the net worth or 
net income of agents (whether firms, households, or the government) is sensitive to 
changes in the exchange rate. In particular, agents in emerging market countries fre-
quently have incurred debt denominated in foreign currency, but rely on assets that yield 
income denominated in the home currency. If this currency, for whatever reason, depre-
ciates, the balance sheet effect of an increase in the burden of debt relative to assets due 
to the currency mismatch might force agents into default and might thus cause or exac-
erbate a crisis. 
Currency mismatches are very wide spread in emerging market economies: between 
1999 and 2001, only 2.7% of international debt instruments issued by residents in de-
veloping countries were issued in the domestic currency2 (for the euro area, by compari-
son, the share was 56.8%.; see Eichengreen et al (2005a)). Although some Latin Ameri-
can countries (Uruguay, Colombia, and Brazil) have recently managed to issue interna-
tionally bonds in local currency, the share of overall debt in these countries is still small 
(Tovar 2005). An obstacle for raising such loans can certainly be the lack of trust in the 
                                                 
2  Developing countries are defined here according to the Bank for International Settlements; it includes 
such fairly advanced countries like the Czech Republic, Israel or South Korea.  
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stability of the domestic currency. However, even countries with quite a good recent 
track record of stability oriented macroeconomic policy appear to have a hard job in 
overcoming the high barriers. Eichengreen and Hausmann have therefore named the in-
ability to use the home currency to borrow abroad "original sin" (Eichengreen et al. 
(2005a); the first, somewhat broader definition of original sin is found in Eichengreen 
and Hausmann 1999). 
Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2002) and Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005) ar-
gue that a road to redemption from original sin leads over an inflation-indexed basket of 
currencies of emerging and developing countries, a so-called EM index, defined by the 
World Bank. Together with other international financial institutions as the IMF, the 
World Bank should then issue bonds denominated in the EM index and invest the pro-
ceeds into emerging markets bonds that are denominated in the currencies of the coun-
tries. Eichengreen and Hausmann argue that such financial transactions need only be 
temporary and of limited size in order to help establishing liquid international markets 
for bonds denominated in home currencies. 3 
This paper does not discuss the potential chances of that happening. Instead, we set up a 
framework  in  which  original  sin  can  be  analysed,  and  discuss  under  which circum-
stances taking debt denominated in the EM index instead of dollars may be a safeguard 
against currency crises. In doing so we use some tools provided by the modern theoreti-
cal literature about currency crises. 
                                                 
3  Their proposal seems to find a political echo in plans of the Asian Development Bank to create an 
"Asian Currency Index" in order to help develop regional bond markets (Financial Times, March 
27th 2006: "Launch of Asian Currency unit held up by political bickering").  
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2.  Original sin and the third generation of currency crisis-
models 
The role of currency mismatches is central for third-generation models of currency cri-
ses (Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000, 2001) and Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2002)). 
Those models were built as a reaction of economic theory to the Asian crisis 1997/98, 
when fiscal and monetary policy in the countries hit by the crisis mostly appeared to be 
sound, but balance sheet effects due to depreciations forced many private agents like 
banks into default. Therefore, it is the private sector that is affected by original sin in 
these models, whereas original sin in principle can be a problem for both private and 
public agents. 
One shortcoming of the standard type of third-generation models is that they focus only 
on the negative effects of depreciation on output. As Goldstein (2004, page 1) remarks, 
however, a good measure of the extent of currency mismatch ought to take the potential 
response of noninterest flows (like exports) to an exchange rate change into account as 
well; after all, a depreciation always makes the home producers of tradable goods more 
competitive and tends to cushion the effects of a negative shock on output. Therefore, in 
the next section the negative and positive effects of an unexpected currency move will 
be modeled. Clearly, if prices were perfectly flexible, they would adapt to exchange rate 
changes in such a way that there would be no real effect. This paper, however, is based 
on the assumption of sticky prices. It differs from the papers mentioned above in explic-
itly modeling the price setting behaviour of firms. Prices have to be set in home cur-
rency in advance and are sticky in the short run. On the one hand, firms may become in-
solvent due to balance sheet effects if the home currency depreciates. On the other hand, 
if the currency appreciates, firms will become less competitive.4 
Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000, 2001) derive important insights about the right 
reaction of monetary policy to a currency crisis; indeed, in their framework, the optimal 
reaction could in general prevent crises in the first place, and thus, in their framework, 
currency crises do not occur if all agents behave rationally. This appears to be a some-
what optimistic implication. In the model presented in the next section, the effects of 
monetary policy do not come off fast enough to prevent a currency crisis after a negative 
external shock has hit. Ex ante, monetary policy is optimal. The focus is not on mone-
                                                 
4  The reader may ask whether these are realistic assumptions. The model, however, should be inter-
preted as a simple representation of much more complicated economies. For those economies, it ap-
pears plausible that export prices are largely determined by prices set in home currency units and that 
these are sticky in the short run. For example, home subcontractors might have contracted fixed 
prices with exporting firms for the running year.  
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tary policy, but on the basic mechanisms of nominal shocks affecting real output in an 
original sin economy, and on the implications of the option to incur debt denominated in 
the EM index. 
Our approach differs from the standard type of third-generation models of currency cri-
ses in two other respects: first, the standard type focuses on multiple equilibria: pessi-
mistic (and optimistic) expectations about the currency are self-fulfilling. While this is 
an interesting and serious issue, it has the drawback that nobody can be sure whether it 
is a real world phenomenon because two potential equilibria are usually unobservable. 
In addition, currency mismatches are, as shown below, still a problem even if the equi-
librium  is  unique.  Thus,  although  multiple  equilibria  are  a  possible  scenario  in  the 
model presented below, they are not the focus of the paper. Finally, in the standard type 
of third generation models it is assumed that from a certain future period onwards, the 
economy will be stable again. This assumption is, without effects on results, replaced by 
modeling an economy with a final period in which prices are flexible.  
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3.  A formal analysis 
3.1  The simple macro model of an original sin-economy 
Economies  frequently  get  into  trouble  when  the  exchange  rates  of  their  currencies 
change abruptly. One important reason for this is that prices usually react with some lag 
if the exchange rate moves unexpectedly, although prices are flexible in the long run. 
This fact is captured by the time structure of the simple model presented in this section. 
In  0 t = , firms form expectations about exchange rate in  1 t =  and set their prices for this 
period. Between  0 t =  and  1 t = , the central bank injects money into the economy. In 
1 t =  there might be a money demand shock (which will be discussed in section 3.2) and 
the short term equilibrium of the economy with an exchange rate, trade in goods and 
liquidation of insolvent firms is realized. If there is a money demand shock, the ex-
change rate and output are affected. As to output, this is so because prices in period 1 
have already been fixed in  0 t = . Period  2 t =  is the long run period, because now prices 
are flexible. The "long run" realizations of prices and the exchange rate in this final pe-
riod are important because expectations about these realizations are determinants of the 
exchange rate in  1 t = . 
The economy is small relative to world markets. There is a sector for nontraded goods 
with output y, and a sector for tradable goods that are mostly exported with output  x. 
The model explains how much output is sold in the short run-period 1. In the export-
oriented sector, there is an infinity of identical, small firms each offering one unit of 
output on the competitive world market. If all firms sell their unit of output, the aggre-
gate sale will be 
max x . Firms maximize expected profits by setting their prices. We as-
sume that prices have to be denominated in terms of the home currency. Since the world 
market price (in dollar terms) is  1 p
* = , the highest price for which firms can sell their 
unit of output is  1 1 x p e =  with  1 e  as the exchange rate in period 1 in price notation. 
Prices, however, have to be set before, in period  0 t = . Firms will only be able to sell 
their unit of output if  1 e ³ 1 x p . We assume that the equilibrium exchange rate in the ab-
sence of shocks,  1 e
*, which will be derived in the following, is unique; this rate is calcu-
lated  by  each  firm  i   in  period  0;  however,  an  error  term  enters  the  calculations: 
[ ] 0 1 1
i
i E e e e
* = +  with  i e  as a random variable which, for all firms in the export sector, fol-
lows the lognormal distribution (log because there are no negative prices) with mean 0 
and  standard  deviation  s .  Thus,  the  mean of the exchange rates expected by firms 
[ ] 0 1 E e   equals  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate:  [ ] 0 1 1 E e e
* = .  Each  firm  i   knows  that  it 
makes errors in forecasting, and it knows the distribution of the error term  i e  (this struc-
ture of knowledge is similar to that e. g. found in Morris and Shin (1998) or Lindner 
(2006)).  
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Clearly, the lower the price  1 x p , the higher the probability that the output will be sold; 
firms, however, can fail for another reason: the currency can be too weak as well as too 
high for the price set in advance, because each firm has incurred the same amount of 
debt  1/2 i D =  denominated in dollar terms to finance production of  1 t = -output. If reve-
nues are so low that the firm is not able to repay its debt in period 1, the foreign credi-
tors will seize the unit of output. For simplicity, we assume that there are no costs other 
than debt repayment. Thus, a further condition for firm  i  to sell its unit of output is 
1 1 1 /2 x i p e D e ³ = . All in all, firms maximize their profit function (in home currency) over 
their price  1 x p , with the exchange rate as a random variable due to the errors firms make 














x x p p
p
e
p p f e E e de m s
* = = - = Õ ∫   (3.1) 
This leads to the following first order condition that determines the unique optimal price 
1 x p













f e de f e m s m s - = ∫   (3.2) 
As the integral in equation 3.2 shows, a marginal increase in the price increases reve-
nues in case of a sale. On the other hand, it increases the probability that it will turn out 
to be too high to be competitive; this is the second term on the left. At  1 x p
* , these two ef-
fects on expected profits cancel each other out. Note that this means that  1 x p
*  is higher 
than the prize that maximizes the probability that output will be sold. 
The distribution of information about the exchange rate and the price setting strategy of 
individual firms imply that the aggregate of the output sold by the export sector is a 
function  [ ] 1 0 1 1 ( , ) x F E e e =  which, for given expectations  [ ] 0 1 E e , is quasiconcave in the 
exchange rate  1 e  (see appendix). If the home currency turns out to be much stronger than 
expected by most firms, the prices of most firms are too high to attract demand; if the 
home currency is much weaker, most firms will not be able to repay their debt and their 
output will be seized by the foreign creditors. However, since firms do not maximize the 
probability of selling but maximize their profits, the exchange rate for which output is 
maximal, 
max
1 e , exceeds the mean expected exchange rate (which equals the equilibrium 
exchange rate in the absence of shocks):  [ ]
max
1 0 1 e E e >  (see figure 1). 
The output of nontraded goods  y is, for simplicity, assumed to be stable:  y y = . By 
definition, there is no world market price in dollars; moreover, producers do not need 
loans and real balance effects are negligible; therefore, the output for nontraded goods is  
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not affected by the exchange rate nor by monetary policy. The price index of nontraded 
goods is the price level of the economy in period 1. Firms can decide in period 0 to pro-
duce either nontraded or export goods; therefore, in equilibrium, expected profits of 
firms producing either nontraded or export goods are equal and profits denominated in 
the home currency are a positive function of the expected exchange rate; thus, a higher 
expected exchange rate means that prices set for nontraded goods are also set to a higher 
level; the price level is a positive function of the expected exchange rate:  [ ] 1 0 1 ( ) P g E e =  
with  ´ 0 g >  (see appendix). 
Figure 1: 











We are now able to express the aggregate output of the economy  1 Y  in prices of the non-
traded good by an output curve function that is, like the output function for the sector 
producing tradables, quasiconcave in the exchange rate  1 e . The output curve function 








F E e e
Y y
g E e
= +   (3.3) 
The exchange rate  1 e  and expectations about its realization  [ ] 0 1 E e  depend on the money 








P g E e
= =   (3.4) 
with  M  as the quantity of money injected into the economy by the central bank in pe-
riod 1,  1 Y  as the output level of the economy in  1 t =  and i  as the interest rate for income  
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invested at home in period 1 and withdrawn in period 2. According to interest rate pari-
ties, the interest rate is a function of the foreign interest rate and the expected deprecia-
tion (or appreciation) of the home currency between period 1 and period 2: 






* + = +   (3.5) 
Inserting equation 3.5 into 3.4 gives the interest rate parity-LM-function that defines the 
IRPLM curve in figure 1: 
[ ]
[ ] 1 2
1
0 1 1




g E e e
* = +   (3.6) 
The curve has a negative slope because a weaker home currency (a higher exchange 
rate) in period 1 means that, for a given long-run exchange rate, the currency is expected 
to appreciate more (or depreciate less), which makes holding money more attractive; 
this is, for a constant money supply M , only compatible with equilibrium on the market 
for money if less output reduces money demand. 
The quantity of money injected into the economy in period 1 raises the price level in the 
"long run" period 2.5 In this final period, all prices are flexible and output is on its natu-
ral (or Walrasian) level. Given the quantity of money M  and the natural output level  2 Y , 







=   (3.7) 
As period 2 is the final period, no interest rate enters the money demand function. Fur-
thermore, export prices in home currency units and the exchange rate are a function of 
the internal price level:  
1 1
2 2 2 2 ( ) ( / ( )) x e p g P g M L Y
- - = = = . This is anticipated by agents 
on the market for money in period 1 ( [ ] 1 2 2 E e e = ). Thus, the interest rate parity-LM-






( / ( ))
( ,(1 ) )
( )
f M L Y M
L Y i
g E e e
-
* = +   (3.8) 
                                                 
5  For simplicity, we assume that the central bank cannot alter the quantity of money in period 2.  
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Intuitively, for a higher quantity of money  M , the home currency gets weaker (the ex-
change rate  1 e  increases) in spite of a fixed price level in period 1, because the foreign 
exchange markets anticipate the fall of the home currency in period 2. 
The two equations 3.3 and 3.8 determine output  1 Y  and exchange rate  1 e  for given ex-
pectations about the exchange rate in t = 1,  [ ] 0 1 E e , and for a given quantity of money 
M . The latter two variables are determined by monetary policy. In period 1, the central 
bank chooses the quantity of money which is optimal according to its objective function: 
monetary policy aims at a high output, and it wants to keep the difference between the 
internal return on holding the home currency between period 1 and 2 and the return of 
bonds low (see Friedman 1969). The return on holding money depends on the change in 
the price level. Assuming price stability abroad, the central bank minimizes the follow-
ing loss function for period 1 over M : 
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] 0 1 1 0 1 2 2 1
1
2 0 1 2
( , ( )) ( )
((1 ) ) ( ) ((1 ) )
2 ( ) 2 / ( )
F E e e M g E e P
L Y i y i
P g E e M L Y
b b * * = - + + - = - + + + -   (3.9) 
with  b  as the factor weighing the target for the return on money relative to that for out-
put. The first order-condition defines the Monetary Policy-function: 
[ ] [ ]
[ ]
0 1 0 1 2
2
2 0 1
( ) ( ( ) /
(1 )
/ ( ) ( )
g E e g E e L Y F M
i
M L Y M g E e
b
*      ¶ ¶   + - =     
      
  (3.10) 
If this condition is fulfilled, injecting marginally more money does not alter the overall 
loss, because, on the one hand, more money weakens the exchange rate and supports 
export firms in the short run, but, on the other hand, it increases inflation and widens the 
gap between the return on money and interest bearing assets. Firms, on average, antici-
pate this condition for optimal monetary policy correctly: in period 0, they expect such a 
weak exchange rate that it will not pay for the central bank to weaken it even more by a 
surprisingly expansionary policy. Thus, the equilibrium of the model consists of the 
equations 3.3 (output function), 3.8 (Interest Rate Parity-LM function), and 3.10 (mone-
tary  policy  function),  and  of  the  conditions  for  (in  the  mean)  rational  expectations 
[ ] 0 1 1 E e e
* =  and  [ ]
1
1 2 2 2 ( / ( )) E e e g M L Y
- = =  (see figure 1). 
3.2.  Exchange rate shocks in the macro model 




( / ( ))
1 ( ,(1 ) )
g M L Y
e L Y i
- * +  can cause large output losses. These shocks occur after M  is injec-  
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ted into the economy. This means that monetary policy is not able to react to the shocks, 
because its effects would not turn up in period 1. This is plausible if, for example, the 
quantity of money  M  is a broad monetary aggregate that reacts slowly to actions taken 
by the central bank. As shown in figure 2, positive shocks move the interest-rate-parity-
LM curve downwards to IRPLM´: the exchange rate appreciates. This affects output ad-
versely, because the goods of many firms become too expensive in dollar-terms. Nega-
tive shocks move the curve upwards to IRPLM´ ´: the exchange rate depreciates: these 
shocks may be interpreted as a sudden loss of confidence into the domestic currency. If 
they are small, output actually increases, because more firms are competitive than in the 
situation without shocks. This is so because, as explained in the section before, profit-
maximizing firms take some risk of losing competitiveness in order to benefit from high 
profits as long as they remain competitive. A large negative shock, however, decreases 
output, because many firms become insolvent due to the balance sheet effect. Indeed, 
comparing the marginal effect of a surprisingly weak currency with the marginal effect 
for a surprisingly strong one, we find that the marginal effect is larger for the first case, 
if the slope of the output curve has the same absolute value. This is so because a con-
traction of output dampens the appreciation, while a depreciating exchange rate and out-
put contraction reinforces each other. Such a situation is usually called a currency crisis. 
Indeed, the reinforcement mechanism can be so strong that the output curve and the in-
terest-rate-parity-LM  curve  might  cross  more  than  once.  In  this  case  (which  is  not 
shown in figure 2, but which is the focus of Jeanne and Jerome (2002)), self-fulfilling 
pessimistic expectations mean that an inefficient equilibrium may be reached. 
Figure 2: 
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3.3.  Original sin: Redemption through the EM index?  
The framework presented above is helpful for analysing whether the proposal to set up a 
bond market denominated in the EM index is conducive to mitigating currency crises. 
Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005) argue that the EM index would ultimately enable 
emerging market countries to issue debt in their own currency. This paper does not dis-
cuss the chances of that happening. Even if it does not ultimately lead to home currency 
debt, the EM index might have some advantage over the dollar. In order to check this, it 
is helpful first to analyse the case that all debt is denominated in the home currency. 
3.3.1.  Home currency denomination of debt 
Foreign investors still demand an expected return of 1/2 a dollar per firm. The expecta-
tions of international investors in  0 t =  about the exchange rate in  1 t =  are rational; they 
do not contain an error term. Thus, investors expect an exchange rate of  [ ] 0 1 1 E e e
* =  and 
all firms have to pay back  [ ] 0 1 /2 E e [ ] 0 1 /2 E e  in home currency. The profit function each 
firm i  maximizes is now:  








x x p p
p
E e
p p f e E e de m s
¥
* = = = - = Õ Õ ∫   (3.11) 
with   [ ] 1 0 1 x p E e ³ . This function differs from equation 3.1 in that a weak home currency 
does not force the firm into default, because the dollar value of debt as well as of reve-
nues declines. The costs of repaying the debt are now fixed in home currency units. As 
in the original sin case, the optimal price  1 x p
** is higher than that which maximizes the 
probability that output will be sold (here, the price that maximizes the probability of a 
sale would be  [ ] 1 0 1 /2 x p E e = . It is the lowest price for which the investors are willing to 
give loans to firms). 
The aggregate of the output sold by the export sector is, as in the original sin case, a 
function of the expected and the realized exchange rate  [ ] 0 1 1 ( , ) F E e e . This function is, 
however, now increasing in the exchange rate  1 e  for given expectations  [ ] 0 1 E e  (see fig-
ure 3 and appendix), because a home currency that turns out to be much weaker than 
expected by most firms does not trigger defaults. Therefore, negative money demand 
shocks do not depress output: on the contrary, output is close to its maximum level if the 
shock is large, because almost all firms are competitive.6 Thus, in the framework pre-
                                                 
6  There is still an expectational equilibrium for monetary policy, because, as in the case of original sin, 
the bank faces the trade off between high output and high inflation.  
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sented  here,  debt  denominated in the domestic currency would protect the economy 
from currency crises. 
Figure 3: 














3.3.2.  Debt denomination in an Emerging Market index 
Now it is assumed that the debts of firms are denominated in the EM index, which is a 
basket of currencies of emerging markets countries.7 Let the share of the home currency 
in the basket be a . The exchange rate of the EM index in price notation relative to the 
dollar is  0 ,1 , [ ] (1 ) b k b i k e E e e a a ¹ = + -  with  k  indexing the home currency and  , b i k e ¹  as the 
notional exchange rate of the index if the home currency were no part of the index. 
Again, investors demand an expected return of 1/2 dollar. This equals  0[ ]/2 b E e  in EM 
index denomination. For now we assume that investors correctly expect other currencies 
to be stable relative to the dollar  , 0 ( [ ]) i k t i k i k e e E e ¹ ¹ ¹ = = . Clearly, if the home currency 
weakens, the index becomes a bit weaker too; the more so the larger the share of the 
home currency in the index. Thus, debt increases by less than in the case of denomina-
tion in dollar. In units of the home currency, the debt firms have to repay equals: 
,1 0 ,1 , 0 1
,1 ,
( [ ] (1 ) ) [ ]
2 ( (1 ) ) 2
k k b i k b k
i
b k b i k










  (3.12) 
                                                 
7  Eichengreen and Hausmann propose to index the basket according to the inflation rates of the curren-
cies. This aspect is not important in our framework, because the price level is fixed in period 1.  
__________________________________________________________________  IWH 
 
IWH-Diskussionspapiere 11/2006  17
EM index-debt is an intermediate case between original sin and home currency debt: for 
0 a ®  the burden approaches its level in the original sin case and the index stays practi-
cally constant relative to the dollar; for  1 a ® , the burden approaches its level in the 
case of home currency debt. The output curve and the effects of a money demand shock 
are, accordingly, also intermediate cases which come close to that shown in figure 2 for 
0 a ®  and close to that shown in figure 3 for  1 a ® . 
Original sin, by its definition, prevents agents to take foreign debt in their domestic cur-
rency. It is plausible that it will also prevent them taking debt in EM index units if the 
share of the home currency is large. If it is small, the index appears to have little protec-
tive power against currency crises. However, if we lift the assumption that the other cur-
rencies of the index are stable, the instrument looks more attractive: a plausible reason 
for the existence of original sin is that investors might not be sure about the soundness 
of the macroeconomic policy of the emerging market country. In our framework, that 
means that they might not be sure about the objective function of the central bank. If the 
central bank puts less emphasis on inflation than expected by firms and investors, the 
bank might have an incentive to devalue, diminishing the dollar value of the loans. A 
safeguard against such a policy may be a very small weight of the currency in the EM 
index basket, because this makes the trade off between inflation and output becomes 
very unfavourable. Hence, under this condition, investors might accept debt denomi-
nated in the EM index. Now consider for this case a situation that the shock hits a sig-
nificant share of the emerging markets countries, for example via contagion. For sim-
plicity, let's assume that all economies of the index are identical and that the same shock 
hits all economies. Then, clearly, the single economy behaves almost as if firms were 
indebted in the home currency: the depreciations will not reduce the output (or, indeed, 
will cause output gains, see figure 3). This is good for the country, but it might also be 
good for investors, because many defaults of debtors are avoided. If this point is more 
important for investors than the loss of return in dollars per loan, a denomination of debt 
in the EM index is Pareto superior to that in dollars.  
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4.  Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the mechanics of original sin in a simple third-generation model 
of currency crises. The approach differed from alternative contributions mainly by ex-
plicitly modeling the price setting behavior of firms if prices are sticky and the future 
exchange rate is uncertain, by taking into account the positive effects of a devaluation 
on export performance, and by deriving an optimal monetary policy in the pre-crisis 
time. It was argued that the proposal of creating an EM index as denominator of debt is 
attractive because the index might be a useful provision against contagion. While in 
normal times there would be little incentive for monetary policy to devalue its own cur-
rency because devaluation affects the value of index-denominated foreign claims only 
slightly, in times of contagion, when many currencies of emerging market economies 
come under pressure, the devaluation of the index would mitigate negative balance sheet 
effects. The distribution of crisis-related costs, however, would shift in favor of firms 
and to the disadvantage of foreign investors. Investors might accept this in normal times 
if the overall costs decrease sufficiently. 
What is not done in this paper, and what may appear as a promising further step, is an 
explicit analysis of the incentives of investors to lend and to stop lending on the basis of 
our framework. This may also lead to an explanation of why original sin exists in the 
first place. From the perspective of Eichengreen and Hausmann, it is a failure of the in-
ternational financial markets that has to be addressed by international policy interven-
tion. For Goldstein (2004, page 2), foreign investors have good reasons not to accept 
loans denominated in domestic currency: "We see the origins of currency mismatch 
primarily in past and present weaknesses of economic policies and institutions in emerg-
ing markets themselves rather than in imperfections in international capital markets." 
Theoretical as well as empirical work will have to address the question which of the two 
points of view is more accurate.  
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Appendix 
Deriving the aggregate output function for the original sin case 
Application of the implicit function rule on equation 3.2 shows that  1 x p
*  is a strictly in-
creasing function of  [ ] 0 1
i E e m = . Because  [ ] 0 1
i E e  is quasiconcave (it is lognormally dis-
tributed), the frequency distribution  1 ( ) x h p
*  of prices set by firms is quasiconcave as 




1 1 0 1 1
/2




x h e E e dp m s
* = ∫  
This function is, again, quaisconcave in  1 e . It enters into equation 3.3. 
 
Deriving the aggregate output function for the case of redemption 
If firms have to repay credit amounting to  0 1 ( ) E e  in  
home currency, the following first order condition determines the unique optimal price 
1 x p
** of firm i : 
1




f e de p E e f e m s m s
¥
- - = ∫  
Again, application of the implicit function rule shows that  1 x p
** is a strictly increasing 
function of  [ ] 0 1
i E e m = . Because  [ ] 0 1
i E e  is lognormally distributed, the frequency distri-
bution  1 ( ) x h p
*  of prices set by firms is quasiconcave as well. The aggregate sales of the 
export sector for a given exchange rate  1 e  are given by: 
[ ]
1
1 1 0 1 1 ( , ( ), )
e
x x h e E e dp m s
**
-¥
= ∫  
with  1 1 / 0 x e ¶ ¶ >  and 
max
1 x x ®  for  1 e ®¥  (see figure 3).  
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